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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the influence of medical malpractice tort reform on the level of private health insurance
company losses incurred. We employ a natural experiment framework centered on a series of tort reform measures
enacted in Texas in 2003 that drastically altered the medical malpractice environment in the state. The results of a
difference-in-differences analysis using a variety of comparison states, as well as a difference-in-difference-in-differences
analysis, indicate that ameliorating medical malpractice risk has little effect on health insurance losses incurred by
private health insurers.
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Introduction
The motivations for reforming the medical malpractice tort
environment, beginning in some states several decades
ago, include assertions that limitations on liability would
reduce expenditures on unnecessary health care services,
specifically those services provided solely in defense of po-
tential liability claims. In reducing defensive medicine prac-
tices, these reforms would thereby reduce overall health
care costs. This assertion relies on health care providers’
responses to a reduction in perceived malpractice risk.
Physicians may reduce services provided, but unless they
are otherwise penalized for providing unnecessary services
(e.g., through managed care plans’ profiling activities), they
may be reluctant to reduce the income associated with
these services. In fact, reducing providers’ expected liability
could also lead to potentially more health care services
provided, that is, a wider range of procedures supplied
or more intensive treatments. If more health care ser-
vices are provided, insurers will experience an increase
in claims, rather than a reduction.
The markets for medical malpractice insurance and
health insurance are linked via the provision of health
care services. A comprehensive evaluation of reform ac-
tivity in either market consequently should recognize
the potential spillover effects of the reform in one mar-
ket to the other. Several prior studies have addressed
the relationship between a change in medical malprac-
tice liability exposure and healthcare costs (for ex-
ample, [1, 2]). A subset of these studies find evidence of
provider responses to a reduction in liability within sam-
ples of patients with certain diagnoses, or among a sample
of the population (for example, Medicare patients). There
is little evidence of how private health insurers generally
fare following reform activity. Studies that specifically con-
sider health insurance markets examine the extent to
which changes in the medical malpractice environment
affect insurance premiums and coverage rates (for ex-
ample, [3, 4]). However, little evidence exists regarding the
extent to which a change in the medical malpractice envir-
onment, such as the implementation of a cap on noneco-
nomic damage levels, might influence losses in the private
health insurance market.
In this paper, we use the experience in Texas to evalu-
ate the effect of medical malpractice tort reform on
losses in the private health insurance market. In 2003,
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Texas passed a series of sweeping medical malpractice
reform measures aimed at reducing the medical profes-
sional liability exposure of health care providers in the
state. The enactment of these reforms provides an oppor-
tunity to examine the influence of the malpractice environ-
ment on insured health losses using a natural experiment
design. Using insurance company financial data from the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
we perform a series of Difference-in-Differences (DD) and
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences (DDD) analyses to
provide evidence that tort reform in Texas had little effect
on the levels of losses incurred by private health insurers
on behalf of insured patients (in other words, claims for
healthcare services).
More specifically, our analysis yields no support for the
hypothesis that the Texas medical malpractice reforms
had and substantial, persistent influence on levels of
health insurance losses. We do find some evidence that
suggests health insurance losses incurred by Texas in-
surers increased in the initial two years following the
reform and our estimates indicate that this increase
was between $400 and $500 per enrollee. However, we
find no other evidence that Texas health insurer losses
were affected by the reform during any other post-
reform year, suggesting that the spillover effects of the
reforms were, at best, short-lived. Taken in its entirety,
our analysis leads us to conclude that medical malprac-
tice reforms had little influence on reducing the cost of
medical care paid for by private health insurers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we discuss
the existing literature that addresses the effects of medical
malpractice tort reform. We note that there are numerous
studies that measure the effects of reform on the target
market (that is, the influence of medical malpractice legal
reforms on the profitability of medical malpractice in-
surers), but only a few studies evaluate the spillover to the
health care environment. In Section III we derive our hy-
pothesis, and in Section IV we describe our data. Section
V presents our empirical methodology, which includes
several approaches to estimate the influence of the reform
using DD and DDD analyses. Section V also details our re-
sults and Section VI provides a discussion of the policy
implications and a conclusion.
Background
Numerous studies have evaluated medical malpractice
liability exposure from varying perspectives. Some of
the earliest research examines the extent to which demo-
graphic, medical, and legal factors influence the frequency
and severity of medical malpractice insurance claims (for
example, [5, 6]). Subsequent studies specifically consider
the influence of tort reform on medical malpractice pay-
ments and provide evidence that tort reform measures
have a non-trivial influence on medical malpractice
damage awards (for example, [7]). Similarly, many
studies find that the tort reform is associated with
lower levels of incurred losses and lower loss ratios for
medical malpractice insurance companies (for example,
[8–10, 11, 12, 13, 14]). The thrust of the empirical evi-
dence is that medical malpractice reform generates a
cost-restraining effect on medical malpractice costs. Of
particular relevance to our analysis is that these studies
suggest that caps on non-economic damages have the
greatest influence on loss levels incurred by medical
malpractice insurers.
There is no consensus in the empirical literature re-
garding how the malpractice environment influences the
actions of healthcare providers and physicians.1 The
consequences of a state reducing malpractice liability
could have a number of effects, theoretically. Providers
could discontinue providing services that were solely
defensive in nature. Alternatively, providers could be
willing bear risky exposures that they had previously
avoided. This response would be evident not only in
providers offering riskier procedures, but deciding to
practice in riskier specialty areas (for example, obstetrics).
More far-reaching consequences include attracting of phy-
sicians from other states, thereby increasing the supply of
services.
Some studies find no evidence of a relation between
malpractice risk and physician behavior. For example,
Sloan and Shadle [2], using survey data as well as Medi-
care data, conclude that medical decisions are not signifi-
cantly affected by tort reform measures. Other studies
provide evidence that physicians respond to higher levels
of malpractice risk by practicing “positive” defensive
medicine and supply additional services which are of
no marginal value to the patient. For example, Kessler
and McClellan [1] find that liability-reducing tort re-
form measures reduce the rates of defensive medicine
in a sample of Medicare beneficiaries and their finding
of the existence of defensive medicine practices is
echoed by other studies in the literature.2 Still other
studies provide evidence that physicians react to higher
levels of malpractice risk by practicing “negative” defen-
sive medicine whereby physicians distance themselves
from certain patient interactions or, in the extreme case,
withdraw from a particular healthcare market.3 For ex-
ample, Currie and MacLeod [15] find that the implemen-
tation of caps on non-economic damages increased the
frequency of C-sections among a large sample of individ-
ual births from 1989 to 2001.
The literature also provides evidence that, via its effect
on physician behavior, tort reform influences private
health insurance market operations.4 An example is Avra-
ham and Schanzenbach [3], who use individual-level sur-
vey data from 1982 through 2007 to test the hypotheses
that either 1) tort reform may reduce damage awards and
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defensive medicine costs or 2) tort reform may increase
providers’ costs by reducing physicians’ caretaking incen-
tives. In support for their first hypothesis, Avraham and
Schanzenbach [3] find that tort reform increases insur-
ance coverage rates. In a more recent paper, Avraham and
Schanzenbach [16] find that treatment intensity for heart
attack victims declines following a cap on noneconomic
damages. Similarly, Avraham, Dafny, and Schanzenbach
[17] find that the enactments of various tort reform
measures reduce group self-insured health insurance
premiums by 1 to 2%. Karl, Born, and Viscusi [18] also
find that the professional liability climate has a non-
trivial influence on the dollar amount of state-level
health insurance losses per capita, though their results
suggest that lower levels of professional liability expos-
ure are associated with higher levels of health insurance
losses.
A number of studies also specifically examine the
Texas market following the state’s comprehensive med-
ical malpractice reform in 2003.5 While the inefficiency
of the tort system was one motivating factor for reform,
the effort also recognized problems in the availability
and affordability of medical malpractice coverage. It was
suggested by some that “crisis” was evident in the pre-
ceding years: Texas reportedly had the lowest number of
physicians per capita in the nation, and one in every four
physicians had a malpractice claim filed against them
each year [19].6 The Texas reform measures, shown in
Table 1, addressed several dimensions of liability and the
most striking of the reform was the measure to cap non-
economic damages. The 2003 reforms drastically chan-
ged the medical malpractice environment in the state
and evidence suggests that the reform resulted in a 60%
reduction in medical malpractice claims rates and a 30%
reduction in payouts per claim [20, 21].
Of the studies that specifically consider the conse-
quences of the Texas tort reform measures enacted in
2003, the most pertinent to our study is Paik et al. [22]
who examine how Medicare spending changed after the
enactment of the Texas reform measures.7 Using both a
county-level and state-level analysis, they find no evi-
dence that Medicare spending declined after the enact-
ment of the reform and provide a degree of evidence
that spending increased following the 2003 reforms. The
analysis of Paik et al. [22] is insightful because it suggests
that physicians in Texas did not alter defensive medicine
practices in a way that led to lower health insurance
cost. In fact, the reform in Texas may have altered pro-
vider behavior in ways that increase healthcare costs,
which is the opposite effect that many proponents of
the Texas tort liability reform had predicted.
In summary, there exists considerable evidence that
medical malpractice reform measures reduce medical mal-
practice awards and also the losses incurred by medical
malpractice insurance companies. There is also disagree-
ment in the literature regarding the extent to which med-
ical malpractice reforms have any meaningful influence on
the provider-patient interaction. However, some studies
provide evidence that tort reform’s influence on provider
behavior ultimately leads to consequences for health in-
surance markets but, again, there is no general consensus
in the literature as to if and how tort reforms influence
insured loss levels in health insurance markets.
Methods
Hypothesis development
Theory and empirical evidence to date suggest that the
indirect effects of tort reform on health insurance costs
are ambiguous. We develop our main hypothesis under
the assumption that risk of a medical malpractice lawsuit
influences the nature of the medical care given by health
care providers and, more broadly, the provider market-
place. Prior to reform, a state’s medical malpractice insur-
ance regulation and unique demographic characteristics
are associated with a level of medical malpractice insur-
ance claims which reflects, among other things, the liti-
giousness of the population and expertise of health care
providers. We hypothesize that providers perceive their
risk of being sued for medical malpractice in a rational
manner, guided by their prior experience, information
about malpractice claims being brought against other
providers, or the cost of medical malpractice insurance.8
Assuming that the medical malpractice environment af-
fects the expected liability costs, there will be an incentive
for medical malpractice providers to take actions to re-
duce exposure to risk. For example, a provider who per-
ceives an increase in liability exposure could order
more tests for insured patients, see fewer patients with
specific health issues, or even exit the geographic mar-
ket altogether. These behavioral changes will generate a
change in levels of health insurance claims, and we
might expect to find a significant relationship between
Table 1 Texas Reform Measures, 2003
Limits noneconomic damages to $250,000
Defendants can appeal class certification directly to the Texas Supreme
Court to decide up front, not after years of costly litigation, if the
plaintiff has a class action.
Law ensures that lawyers are paid in coupons if clients in a class-action
suit get paid in coupons.
A new standard to ensure sued parties pay only their proportionate
responsibility.
Reformed product liability laws so retailers are not liable for a
manufacturer’s mistake.
Enacted liability limits for good Samaritans, volunteer firefighters, charity
volunteers and teachers.
Closed loopholes that allowed trial lawyers to venue shop.
Notes: This table provides summary information regarding the tort reform
measures enacted in Texas in 2003
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changes in the legal environment for medical malpractice
and losses incurred by health insurers. However, since
providers may respond in ways that either increase health
care costs or reduce health care costs, the direction of this
relationship, when evaluated in the aggregate, is ambigu-
ous. To the extent that changes in behavior might, in ef-
fect, all cancel each other out in the aggregate, we provide
the following null hypothesis:
Ho: Liability-reducing reform in the medical
malpractice market has no effect on the level of health
insurance losses.
If we are able to reject the null hypothesis, then we
find in favor of an alternative hypothesis that medical
malpractice reform leads to changes in provider behav-
ior that significantly increases or decreases health in-
surance losses. To the extent that providers do not
instantaneously comprehend the consequences of the
reforms at the time of enactment, the effect on the
health insurance market may be potentially delayed.
However, efforts to over-treat for defensive reasons will
result in an increase in health insurance losses while ef-
forts to avoid certain patients will result in a reduction
in health insurance losses. We note that rejection of the
null hypotheses could also result from changes in pro-
vider behavior outside of simply interacting with the
patient. Reforms could lead to an expansion in the
number of physicians in the state and the supply of
medical care. Medical malpractice market reforms also
could influence the nature of rents demanded by physi-
cians from health insurance companies, thereby poten-
tially influencing health insurance losses without
changing the nature of provider-patient interactions. As
such, evidence on the validity of our hypothesis will not
evaluate the specific nature of a medical professionals’
behavior changes surrounding medical malpractice re-
forms, but rather the ultimate effect of the changes on
health insurance losses.
Examining the experience of the private health in-
surers in Texas before and after the malpractice reform
effort would provide evidence on whether malpractice
reforms have implications for health insurance markets
as well as the direction of these effects. Specifically, if
the reforms passed in Texas had no effect on provider
behavior, then we would expect the levels of health in-
surance losses incurred by Texas health insurers to be
equal before and after the reform. Such a result would
provide support for our null hypothesis. Alternatively, if
the Texas reforms altered physician behavior in a way
that resulted in either higher or lower levels of health
insurance losses, then we would expect levels of health
insurance losses incurred by health insurers in Texas
before the reforms to differ from the levels after the
implementation of the reforms. Such a result would
support our alternative hypothesis that the ramifications
of medical malpractice reforms for health insurance are
consequential.
Data
We identify several sources of data to test our hypoth-
esis. Data on state tort reform measures comes from the
American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) and the
Database of State Tort Law Reforms [23]. State demo-
graphic data, added to the analysis for a further robustness
check, is obtained from the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and the U.S. Census Bureau. “Health Status” is a
variable provided by the CDC that indicates the overall
health status of a given state in a given year and is increas-
ing in good health. “Dependents” is the number of persons
under the age of 18 per capita in a given state in a given
year. “Females” is the proportion of a state’s population
that is female in a particular year. “Median Income” is the
median income level for residents of a given state during a
given year. “Unemployment Rate” is the proportion of a
particular state’s available workforce that is not employed
in a given year.
Testing of our hypothesis also requires state-specific
data pertaining to health insurance losses. We use in-
surer financial data from the state pages of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) statutory
filings for the years 2001 through 2010.9 This dataset pro-
vides the most complete and comprehensive database of
private health insurance losses.10 We then apply several
filters to this raw dataset in order to screen out insurers
that do not have a significant level of business in a given
state.11 Since we are interested in examining the extent to
which loss levels incurred by health insurers changed
following the Texas reform, it would be inappropriate
to include firms that enter a state market after the re-
form. As such, if insurer i does not operate in state j
from 2001 to 2003, we remove that insurer-state obser-
vation for all future years.12
To test our hypothesis relating to the influence of tort
reform on health insurance losses, we use the NAIC data
to calculate health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE).
This variable is defined as total health insurance losses
incurred for insurer i in state j during year t scaled by
total health enrollees for insurer i in state j during year t
and is ideal for our analysis because it provides a stan-
dardized metric of health insurance losses which facilitates
comparison across all firms.13 In all tables and figures pre-
sented in this analysis, LPE is always expressed as scaled
by $1000 for ease of formatting.
Our analysis focuses on insurers operating in Texas,
New Jersey, Colorado, and three additional subsamples
of states that did not enact significant medical malprac-
tice reforms during our sample period. Table 2 provides
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summary statistics of health insurance LPE, scaled by
$1000, for the insurers operating in these states from
2001 to 2010 in terms of 2010 dollars.14 The table indi-
cates that LPE generally increased over our sample
period in all state samples and suggests that healthcare
costs are rising, in general. Summary inspection of the
Texas data, in particular, indicates that insurers’ mean
LPE increased by roughly about $1000 from the begin-
ning to the end of our sample period. However, there is
no obvious break in this trend surrounding the enact-
ment of the Texas reforms, which is consistent with our
null hypothesis.
Figure 1a – 1f show the mean LPE, and the 95% confi-
dence interval around the mean for the different samples
of insurers in our analysis across our sample period.
The figures reinforce our observations in the summary
data. The gradual upward trend in Texas LPE is easily
observable and, with the exception of New Jersey, largely
mirrors the trends observed in the other non-reforming
states. However, the figure does highlight a relatively
sudden increase in LPE in Texas in 2003 – the year the
reforms were enacted – relative to 2002. The magnitude
of this increase in mean LPE is approximately $300 and
may suggest that reforms had the initial effect of increas-
ing health insurance losses incurred by Texas insurers.
We investigate this possibility in more detail in the ensu-
ing sections.
Difference-in-differences analysis
The dramatic overhaul of Texas’ medical professional
liability climate in 2003 resulting from the enactment
of medical malpractice reforms presents an ideal setting
Table 2 Health Insurance Losses per Enrollee for Different Samples
Health Insurance Losses per Enrollee
Panel A
Texas New Jersey Colorado
Year Mean St. Dev. Insurers Mean St. Dev. Insurers Mean St. Dev. Insurers
2001 1.56 1.85 45 1.78 1.08 18 1.78 1.21 18
2002 1.53 1.49 41 1.45 1.48 34 1.99 1.36 20
2003 1.88 1.79 43 1.41 1.53 34 1.96 1.40 18
2004 1.99 2.09 39 1.51 1.75 34 2.02 1.47 18
2005 2.04 2.22 38 1.71 2.38 34 2.22 1.60 18
2006 1.99 2.23 38 1.39 1.56 31 2.33 1.71 18
2007 2.25 2.52 38 1.47 1.74 30 2.45 1.85 18
2008 2.22 2.62 37 1.50 1.82 30 2.30 1.97 16
2009 2.52 3.00 34 1.71 2.07 29 2.57 2.30 16
2010 2.10 2.67 32 1.72 2.29 28 2.53 2.38 15
Panel B
41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
Year Mean St. Dev. Insurers Mean St. Dev. Insurers Mean St. Dev. Insurers
2001 1.95 3.99 545 1.90 1.27 223 1.94 1.26 96
2002 1.87 1.70 588 2.02 1.72 241 2.07 1.70 108
2003 1.96 1.72 587 2.16 2.01 248 1.98 1.69 110
2004 2.14 1.89 554 2.38 2.17 234 2.14 1.79 103
2005 2.13 1.79 533 2.31 1.89 222 2.21 1.93 96
2006 2.30 1.99 520 2.57 2.26 218 2.53 2.34 95
2007 2.46 2.09 491 2.71 2.30 207 2.64 2.40 92
2008 2.56 2.27 483 2.92 2.57 205 2.67 2.45 89
2009 2.73 2.46 463 3.15 2.83 196 2.90 2.80 88
2010 2.76 2.55 440 3.19 2.88 191 2.97 2.88 86
Notes: This table provides summary information regarding health insurance firms’ Losses per Enrollee (LPE) for each of the subsample of firms used in our
analysis, during each year of our sample period. LPE is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during
a given year, scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. Panel A provides
information pertaining to LPE for a subsample of insurers operating in Texas, New Jersey, or Colorado. Panel B provides information pertaining to LPE for three
subsamples of insures operating in states identified by Paik et al. [24]. “Mean” refers to the mean value of LPE, “St. Dev.” refers to the standard deviation of LPE,
and “Insurers” refers to the number of insurers (observations)
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for testing our hypothesis using a natural experiment
design.15 If, as our alternative hypothesis predicts, the
change in the medical malpractice environment led to
changes in the way medical providers behave in the
healthcare market, which ultimately led to changes in
health insurance losses, then we would not expect
health insurance loss levels before the reform to equal
loss levels after the reform. Further, since the reform
measures only apply to the legal environment in Texas
after the implementation of the new law, we would not
expect the law passed in Texas to have an influence on
the insurance markets of other states pre- or post-
Texas reform. Therefore, comparing the difference in
Texas health insurance losses levels pre- and post-
Texas reform to the difference in the health insurance
losses levels pre- and post- the Texas reform of a state
unaffected by the losses allows us to isolate the direct
influence of the tort reform measures on the health in-
surance market in Texas.
For robustness in the DD, we first identify insurers oper-
ating in two different non-treated states – New Jersey and
Colorado, and perform two separate DD analyses. Neither
state had major upheaval in the health insurance market-
place (such as health insurance reforms) in the time closely
preceding and following the implementation of the Texas
tort reforms. Further, neither state enacted any major med-
ical malpractice insurance reforms during the time of the
Texas tort reforms. Of note is that Colorado had several
tort reform measures in place prior to 2003, including
caps on non-economic damages (enacted in 1987), while
New Jersey had relatively few tort reform measures in
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Fig. 1 a Trends in health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) – Texas. b Trends in health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) – New Jersey.c Trends in
health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) – Colorado. d Trends in health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) – 9 State Subsample. e Trends in health
insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) – 18 State Subsample. f Trends in health insurance losses per enrollee (LPE) - – 41 State Subsample.Notes: These
figures display trends in health insurance firms’ Losses per Enrollee (LPE), for each of the subsample of firms used in our analysis during our sample
period. LPE is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the
number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000
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Following Paik et al. [22], we also identify three add-
itional non-treated subsamples, comprised of insurers
operating in states unaffected by tort reforms during our
sample period. The first subsample consists of insurers
operating in the 41 states that did not enact a major tort
reform from 2001 to 2010.16 The second subsample con-
sists of insurers operating in the 18 states that never
enacted a cap on non-economic damages or total dam-
ages during the sample period.17 The third subsample
consists of insurers operating in nine states that did not
enact a cap on damages and, as suggested by Paik et al.
[22], are similar to Texas both geographically and cultur-
ally.18 Using the same non-treated states as Paik et al.
[22] adds another element of robustness to our individ-
ual state comparisons and allows us to consider their
conclusions in the context of private health insurance
markets.19
In theory, implementation of the DD analysis in-
volves comparing the difference in mean health insur-
ance LPE between insurers operating in Texas and
insurers in the non-treated samples before the enact-
ment of the Texas reform. This difference is then
compared to the difference in mean health insurance
LPE between insurers operating in Texas and insurers
in the non-treated samples after the Texas reform.
While the Texas reforms went into effect in the latter
part of 2003, their first full year of implementation
was 2004. As a result, our DD analysis considers how
losses changed in 2004 and onward relative to 2003
and before.
In practice, the DD analysis is implemented using a re-
gression framework.20 We estimate several unique model
specification that take the general form of the following
OLS model:
LPEit ¼ aþ β1Treatit þ β2 Reformt þ β3Treatit
 Reformt þ εit ð1Þ
where.
Treat = a dummy variable indicating insurer i is a
member of the treatment group in year t and captures
differences between the treatment and control group.
In our analysis, Treat is equal to one for insurers
operating in Texas and zero for insurers operating in
the other non-treated states described previously;
Reform = a dummy variable equal to one if the year is
greater than or equal to 2004 and 0 if the year is less
than 2004; and.
Treat*Reform = a dummy variable equal to one for
insurers that are members of the treatment group in
the years after the enactment of the tort reforms.







The numerical value of this coefficient is the difference
in the differences of mean health insurance LPE in
Texas and the control state before and after the imple-
mentation of the reforms. The t-test of the coefficient
indicates if the difference-in-difference estimate is statis-
tically significant. A statistically insignificant β3 would
prevent us from rejecting the null hypothesis that the
Texas reforms influenced physician behavior in a way
that spilled over into the health insurance marketplace.
A statistically significant and positive (negative) β3 would
provide support for our alternative hypothesis that the
enactment of the Texas tort reforms influenced phys-
ician behavior in a way that, in the aggregate, increased
(decreased) health insurance losses.
Difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis
In an effort to provide further evidence on the validity of
our hypothesis, we employ a difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) analysis where we include, as an add-
itional control group, a sub-sample insurers operating in
lines of business not related to health insurance or med-
ical malpractice markets. The identification assumptions
of the DDD are more robust than that of a DD analysis
and helps to confirm the findings of the previous section.
In particular, a DDD strategy controls for the potentially
confounding trend of changes in health insurance losses
over time that are not related to medical malpractice re-
form21 and also controls for the confounding effects of
state-specific factors that affect insurance losses, generally.
As such, the DDD framework improves on the shortcom-
ings of the DD analysis by controlling for a broad set of
other influences. If our results are robust to a DDD ana-
lysis, this would suggest that our results are not due to
spurious developments in the state’s health insurance
environment.
To implement the DDD, we select as the additional con-
trol group a subsample of insurers operating in private pas-
senger automobile physical damage insurance in Texas,
New Jersey, Colorado, and the three multi-state subsam-
ples identified by Paik et al. [22].22 We quantify the losses
incurred by these insurers in the given states as losses per
automobile (LPA), calculated as the amount of private
passenger automobile physical damage losses incurred
by insurer i in state j during year t scaled by a weighted
measure of the number of automobiles insured by insurer i
in state j during year t.23 We then compare the difference-
in-differences between LPE and LPA in Texas pre and
post Texas tort reform with the difference-in-differences
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between LPE and LPA in the control state(s) pre and post
Texas tort reform.
In practice, the DDD analysis is implemented using a re-
gression framework. We estimate several unique model
specifications that take the general form of the following
OLS model:
Lossesit ¼ ai þ β1Treat þ β2Control þ β3Treat
 Control þ β4 Reform þ β5Treat
 Reformþ β6Control  Reform
þ β7Treat þ Control  Reformþ εit ð2Þ
where.
Losses = insurer i’s LPE if the insurer is a health
insurer or insurer i’s LPA if the insurer is an auto
insurer in a given state in a given year;
Treat = a dummy variable indicating insurer i is a
member of the treatment group in year t and captures
differences between the treatment and control group.
In our analysis, Treat is equal to one for insurers
operating in Texas and zero for insurers operating in
the other states described previously;
Control = a dummy variable indicating insurer i is a
health insurer in year t and captures the effects that
the insurance market, in general, may have on health
insurance losses levels. In our analysis, Control is
equal to one if the insurer is operating in health
insurance lines and equal to zero if the insurer is
operating in automobile insurance lines in a given
state in a given year;
Reform = a dummy variable equal to one if the year is
greater than or equal to 2004 and 0 if the year is less
than 2004; and.
Treat*Control*Reform = a dummy variable equal to
one if insurer i is a health insurer operating in a
non-treated state in year 2004 or later.
The coefficient on Treat*Control*Reform, β7, is the
difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator. The nu-
merical value of this coefficient is the difference-in-
differences-in-differences of mean LPE and LPA in Texas
and the control state before and after the implementation
of the reforms. The t-test of the coefficient indicates if the
DDD is statistically significant. A statistically insignificant
β7 would prevent us from rejecting the null hypothesis
that the Texas reforms influenced physician behavior in a
way that spilled over into the health insurance market-
place. A statistically significant and positive (negative) β7
would provide support for our alternative hypothesis that
the enactment of the Texas tort reforms influenced
physician behavior in a way that, in the aggregate,
increased (decreased) health insurance losses.
Results and discussion
Table 3 displays the results of estimating eq. 1 for five
distinct model specifications, where each specification
differs only by the sample of insurers designated as non-
treated. For all specifications, we cluster standard errors
at the firm level. As shown in the table, none of the co-
efficients on the DD estimator are statistically significant
at conventional levels. This result suggests that the mean
change in Texas health insurers’ LPE was not statistically
different from the mean change in non-reform state
Table 3 Basic Difference-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms
New Jersey Colorado 41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
DD Estimator 0.4276 0.0687 −0.0039 −0.1983 −0.0706
[0.268] [0.304] [0.243] [0.251] [0.269]
Treatment Dummy 0.1557 −0.2526 −0.2653 −0.3743 −0.3398
[0.319] [0.342] [0.233] [0.243] [0.262]
Reform Dummy 0.0689 0.4278** 0.5004*** 0.6948*** 0.5671***
[0.138] [0.209] [0.091] [0.114] [0.150]
Constant 1.5024*** 1.9107*** 1.9234*** 2.0323*** 1.9979***
[0.232] [0.282] [0.113] [0.144] [0.175]
Observations 687 560 5589 2570 1348
R-squared 0.0182 0.0137 0.0110 0.0260 0.0202
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 1. The dependent variable,
Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the
number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. In the table, “DD estimator” is the difference-in-
differences estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, and “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the Texas reform
measures. Each column of output represents a separate analysis that differs only by the subsample of firms used as non-treated groups. Clustered standard errors are
presented in parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, and **indicates p < 0.05
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health insurers’ LPE from in the years 2004–2010 rela-
tive to 2001–2003. This evidence is consistent with our
null hypothesis that the Texas tort reform efforts had no
spillover effects that substantially influenced the losses
incurred by health insurers.
The results presented in Table 4 confirm that, with
one exception, the results displayed in Table 3 are not
sensitive to the inclusion of state-level demographic con-
trol variables. The exception is that we find that mean
changes in LPE were larger in for Texas insurers in the
years following the reform relative to their New Jersey
counterparts. The magnitude of this coefficient, which is
significant at the 10% level, indicates that, relative to
New Jersey, insurers operating in Texas experience an
increase in LPE of approximately $519, on average, in
the years following the reforms. This result is consistent
with our alternative hypothesis and other findings in the
literature (e.g., [22]) that the reforms in Texas actually
bent the healthcare cost curve upward. However, in light
of the fact that the DD estimator is not statistically sig-
nificant in the other model specifications, the results of
the New Jersey specification do not provide compelling
support for the rejection of our null hypothesis.
As a robustness exercise, we compare differences in
losses levels in 2002 to differences in losses levels in
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. These es-
timates help to illustrate the significance and magnitude
of the difference in LPE in the year immediately preced-
ing the enactment of the reforms, to each individual year
following the reform. The results of this year-by-year
DD analysis for the insurers operating in the subsample
of 9 states as the control group are given in Table 5.24
For the sake of brevity, we discuss the results of the
other subsamples, where relevant, instead of reporting
the full year-by-year analysis for all subsamples.25 As
shown in the table, the DD estimator is statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level only in the 2002–2004 period.
This result indicates that, relative to the year 2002, mean
LPE increased at a greater rate for Texas insurers than
the non-Texas insurers in the 9 state subsample for the
year 2004 through 2010. The magnitude of the coeffi-
cient suggest the change in LPE experienced by Texas
Table 4 Difference-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms Including Full Variable Set
New Jersey Colorado 41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
DD Estimator 0.5193* 0.1734 0.0566 −0.1421 −0.1018
[0.292] [0.291] [0.249] [0.262] [0.276]
Treatment Dummy −0.5373 −0.1091 0.2461 0.1101 −0.3308
[0.748] [0.578] [0.331] [0.545] [0.755]
Reform Dummy 0.1043 0.2086 0.3786*** 0.5063** 0.6322**
[0.163] [0.139] [0.130] [0.199] [0.247]
Health Status −0.0056 0.0253 −0.0285 −0.0319 −0.0535
[0.037] [0.043] [0.027] [0.042] [0.038]
Dependents 0.2297 −0.0202 −0.1281*** −0.0814 0.0458
[0.215] [0.200] [0.048] [0.121] [0.198]
Females −0.0646 −0.0173 −0.0125 0.0355 0.0006
[0.063] [0.118] [0.073] [0.085] [0.109]
Median Income 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Unemployment Rate 0.0774*** 0.0347 0.0607*** 0.0714** 0.0600*
[0.023] [0.031] [0.021] [0.029] [0.033]
Constant −1.9597 1.2360 6.0315 1.6430 1.6183
[5.237] [7.573] [4.276] [5.848] [9.012]
Observations 687 560 5589 2570 1348
R-squared 0.0202 0.0161 0.0197 0.0370 0.0276
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 1. The dependent variable,
Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the
number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. “DD estimator” is the difference-in-differences
estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, and “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the Texas reform measures.
“Health status”, “Dependents”, “Females”, “Median income” and “Unemployment rate” are all state-level demographic control variables previously described. Each
column of output represents a separate analysis that differs only by the subsample of firms used as non-treated groups. Clustered standard errors are presented
in parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, **indicates p < 0.05, and *indicates p < 0.1
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health insurers was approximately $390 greater than
their counterparts in the 9 state subsample.
In unreported analysis, we also find changes in Texas
LPE in 2004, relative to 2002, were greater than the
changes experienced by health insurers operating in
New Jersey and Colorado over the same period. However,
regardless of the sample examined, we find no other
evidence that changes in Texas LPE in any ensuing year
(i.e. 2005 to 2010) were significantly greater than those
experienced by insurers operating in other states. Taken
together, this year-by-year DD analysis suggests that the
spillover effects of the Texas reforms into the health in-
surance market were, at best, short-lived and influenced
Texas health insurers only during 2004. While this re-
sult does favor our alternative hypothesis, the evidence
is weak and does not provide compelling evidence that
the Texas reforms had a long-lasting and substantial ef-
fect on the health insurance market.
Considered in their entirety, the results presented in
Tables 3 through 5 provide little support for the hypoth-
esis that the Texas reforms had a significant influence
on the health insurance market – the vast majority of
our model specifications fail to find a significant change
in Texas LPE after the enactment of tort liability reforms.
In the few instances we do find a statistically significant
spillover effect, our estimates suggest the reforms had the
effect of increasing LPE. However, in these cases, the re-
sults are not robust across all subsample analyses and/or
the effect is short-lived and we therefore are unable to re-
ject null hypotheses based on the evidence in the DD ana-
lysis. In the ensuing subsection, we explore the robustness
of our findings by extending our DD analysis to control
for other potential confounding factors.
Table 6 displays the results of estimating eq. 2, our
DDD model, for five distinct model specifications, where
each specification differs only by the sample of insurers
designated as non-treated.26 The DDD estimator is sta-
tistically insignificant in all but one of the five model
specifications which provides little support for the hy-
pothesis that the Texas liability reforms had any mean-
ingful impact on losses incurred by health insurers
operating in Texas. However, the DDD estimator is sta-
tistically significant at the 5 % level when the New Jersey
insurer subsample is used and the magnitude of the co-
efficient indicates the net increase in LPE incurred by
Texas insurers in the post-reform time period was ap-
proximately $620. The results in Table 7 further suggest
that our DDD analysis is robust to the addition of sev-
eral state-level demographic control variables.27 The
DDD analysis, therefore, provides little evidence in favor
of our alternative hypothesis.
In Table 8, we provide the results of a DDD analysis
where LPE in 2002 is compared to the years 2004
through 2010 in an effort to illustrate the significance
and magnitude of difference in LPE in the year immedi-
ately preceding the enactment of the reforms, to each in-
dividual year following the reform.28 The table indicates
that, relative to the non-treated group of insurers operat-
ing in the nine-state subsample, mean LPE in Texas
were higher and statistically different from zero in the
first two years following the reform. In particular, the
magnitude of the DDD estimator coefficient suggests
that the net increase in mean LPE for Texas insurers in
2004, relative to 2002, was approximately $490 and this
same increase was approximately $435 in 2005 relative
to 2002. Again, this evidence suggests that, at best, the
spillover effect of the Texas reforms on the health insur-
ance market was short-lived. In unreported analysis using
the New Jersey insurers, Colorado insurers, and the 41
state subsample of insurers, we find further evidence of
Table 5 Difference-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms for Nine State Sample and Multiple Time Periods
2002–2004 2002–2005 2002–2006 2002–2007 2002–2008 2002–2009 2002–2010
DD Estimator 0.3914* 0.3710 0.0004 0.1473 0.0909 0.1681 −0.3316
[0.235] [0.255] [0.260] [0.323] [0.342] [0.426] [0.381]
Treatment Dummy −0.5408* −0.5408* −0.5408* −0.5408* −0.5408* −0.5408* −0.5408*
[0.293] [0.293] [0.293] [0.293] [0.293] [0.293] [0.293]
Reform Dummy 0.0739 0.1404 0.4590*** 0.5727*** 0.6043*** 0.8266*** 0.9023***
[0.117] [0.131] [0.169] [0.190] [0.189] [0.233] [0.255]
Constant 2.0696*** 2.0696*** 2.0696*** 2.0696*** 2.0696*** 2.0696*** 2.0696***
[0.201] [0.201] [0.201] [0.201] [0.201] [0.201] [0.201]
Observations 291 283 282 279 275 271 267
R-squared 0.0130 0.0143 0.0276 0.0321 0.0333 0.0438 0.0502
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 1 and only using the
subsample of firms operating in 9 states as the non-treated group. The dependent variable, Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health
insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during
a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. In the table, “DD estimator” is the difference-in-differences estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, and
“Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the Texas reform measures. Each column of output represents a separate analysis that compares LPEs in the
year 2002 to a given, single year in the future. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, and *indicates p < 0.1
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statistically significant increases in mean LPE in the initial
year or two following the reform that do not persist to
future years.
As a whole, the results of the DDD analysis provide
additional support for the conclusion drawn in the DD
analysis. There is very little evidence to suggest that the
Texas tort liability reforms had a substantial prolonged
spillover effect on health insurers operating in Texas in
the years following the reforms. We do find some evi-
dence that mean LPE in Texas increased at a greater rate
than that of New Jersey, but this result does not hold for
any of the four other subsamples of insurers used as
controls. In addition, we find some evidence that LPE in
Texas increased to a greater degree than non-Texas in-
surers in the year immediately following the reform but
this effect does not persist to other future years. As a re-
sult, we are unable to definitively reject the null hypoth-
esis, as there does not appear to be sufficient evidence in
favor of the alternative.
Conclusion
Using a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis, we find
evidence that the Texas tort reform measures enacted in
2003 had little influence on the levels of health
insurance losses per enrollee incurred by Texas health
insurers. We utilize several non-treated groups and find
that this result is not sensitive to the selection of the
non-treated group. In an effort to control for state-
specific insurance climates in general, we also consider
automobile physical damage losses incurred by insurers
in our sample and employ a difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) analysis, the results of which are largely
consistent with the DD analysis. Our results provide sup-
port for our null hypothesis that reform measures in the
medical malpractice market did not have a significant,
persistent effect on health insurance losses.
Interestingly, our analysis does provide some evidence
that the reforms had an immediate, but short-term spill-
over effect on health insurance markets. In particular,
we find that the LPE for Texas insurers increased to a
greater degree than non-Texas insurers in the first two
years following the enactment of the reform. This evi-
dence is consistent with the work of Paik et al. [22], who
present evidence that Texas’ tort reform did not bend
the healthcare cost curve downward as was suggested by
many proponents of tort liability reform. However, since
we find no other evidence that the reforms influenced
the levels of health insurance losses incurred by Texas
Table 6 Basic Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms
New Jersey Colorado 41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
DDD Estimator 0.6191** 0.2000 0.1505 −0.0424 0.0821
[0.270] [0.305] [0.245] [0.253] [0.271]
Treatment Dummy 0.3992*** 0.2950*** 0.3064*** 0.3221*** 0.2984***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038]
Control Dummy 1.2416*** 1.5457*** 1.5698*** 1.6944*** 1.6363***
[0.231] [0.280] [0.113] [0.143] [0.174]
Control*Treatment −0.2435 −0.5476 −0.5717** −0.6964*** −0.6382**
[0.320] [0.342] [0.236] [0.246] [0.264]
Reform Dummy −0.0138 −0.0741*** −0.0509*** −0.0494*** −0.0527***
[0.016] [0.012] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Treatment*Reform −0.1916*** −0.1312*** −0.1544*** −0.1560*** −0.1527***
[0.041] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
Control*Reform 0.0827 0.5019** 0.5513*** 0.7442*** 0.6198***
[0.138] [0.208] [0.091] [0.114] [0.150]
Constant 0.2608*** 0.3650*** 0.3536*** 0.3379*** 0.3616***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Observations 2447 2873 42,436 21,281 11,603
R-squared 0.2338 0.3113 0.3469 0.4252 0.3794
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 2. The
dependent variable, Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a
given year, scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. “DDD estimator” is the dif-
ference-in-differences-in-differences estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the
Texas reform measures, “Control dummy” indicates health insurers, “Control*Treatment” is the interaction of Control dummy and Treatment dummy, “Treat-
ment*Reform” is the interaction of Treatment dummy and Reform dummy, and “Control*Reform” is the interaction of Control dummy and Reform dummy.
Each column of output represents a separate analysis that differs only by the subsample of firms used as non-treated groups. Clustered standard errors are pre-
sented in parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, **indicates p < 0.05, and *indicates p < 0.1
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insures after 2005, our conclusion is that reforming the
malpractice environment has largely insignificant eco-
nomic implications for health insurance markets.
Our analysis provides novel and valuable insight into
the consequences of tort reform. Proponents of tort liabil-
ity reforms often suggest that reforms reduce defensive
medicine practices, thereby reducing healthcare costs.
Our analysis suggests that, if there are any persistent ef-
fects of tort reforms on provider-patient interactions, they
do not spillover into health insurance markets. If anything,
our analysis suggests these reforms may lead to initial,
short-term increases in costs borne by health insurers. As
such, our analysis should suggest to policy makers that,
while there are potentially many economic benefits to tort
liability reforms, reforms do not appear to be useful for in-
fluencing outcomes in health insurance markets.
An important consideration when interpreting our
results is that our analysis provides evidence that the
Texas reform had little influence on levels of health in-
surance losses, in the aggregate, across a variety of pa-
tient groups and provider specialties. That is, because
health insurance companies reporting to the NAIC en-
gage in a variety of health insurance lines, such as indi-
vidual and group comprehensive healthcare, dental
Table 7 Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms Including Full Variable Set
New Jersey Colorado 41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
DDD Estimator 0.6221** 0.2013 0.1516 −0.0432 0.0817
[0.269] [0.305] [0.245] [0.253] [0.271]
Treatment Dummy 0.1862 0.0750 0.3041*** 0.2471*** 0.0820
[0.215] [0.118] [0.044] [0.061] [0.077]
Control Dummy 1.2415*** 1.5460*** 1.5711*** 1.6950*** 1.6355***
[0.232] [0.280] [0.114] [0.143] [0.174]
Control*Treatment −0.2435 −0.5480 −0.5730** −0.6969*** −0.6375**
[0.321] [0.342] [0.236] [0.246] [0.263]
Reform Dummy −0.0218 −0.0665*** −0.0412*** −0.0263 0.0145
[0.052] [0.023] [0.013] [0.017] [0.023]
Treatment*Reform −0.1455*** −0.1113*** −0.1523*** −0.1608*** −0.1607***
[0.052] [0.040] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]
Control*Reform 0.0805 0.5010** 0.5507*** 0.7452*** 0.6208***
[0.136] [0.208] [0.091] [0.114] [0.150]
Health Status 0.0124 0.0149 −0.0033 −0.0060 −0.0051
[0.012] [0.010] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
Dependents 0.0529 0.0553 0.0003 0.0226* 0.0641***
[0.071] [0.040] [0.005] [0.013] [0.021]
Females −0.0160 0.0069 0.0009 −0.0017 −0.0223*
[0.025] [0.024] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012]
Median Income 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Unemployment Rate 0.0215*** 0.0178*** 0.0101*** 0.0095** 0.0077*
[0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant −0.7595 −1.9630 0.4092 −0.0350 0.0713
[1.976] [1.368] [0.571] [0.674] [0.954]
Observations 2447 2873 42,436 21,281 11,603
R-squared 0.2342 0.3118 0.3472 0.4260 0.3831
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 2. The
dependent variable, Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year,
scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. In the table, “DDD estimator” is the
difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of
the Texas reform measures, “Control dummy” indicates firms operating as health insurers, “Control*Treatment” is the interaction of Control dummy and Treatment
dummy, “Treatment*Reform” is the interaction of Treatment dummy and Reform dummy, and “Control*Reform” is the interaction of Control dummy and Reform
dummy. “Health status”, “Dependents”, “Females”, “Median income” and “Unemployment rate” are all state-level demographic control variables previously described.
Each column of output represents a separate analysis that differs only by the subsample of firms used as non-treated groups. Clustered standard errors are presented in
parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, **indicates p < 0.05, and *indicates p < 0.1
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and vision, Medicaid, Medicare, and Federal Employee
Health Benefits, our analysis captures the net result of
changes in medical professionals’ behavior among a
heterogeneous group of provider and patient types. This
degree of heterogeneity is often not present in studies of
malpractice liability’s influence on physician behavior and
healthcare costs (for example [1, 2, 22]). As a result, if tort
reform’s effects on provider behavior differ by the pro-
vider’s specialty type or the type of patient, then different
analyses presented in the literature, utilizing different but
relatively homogenous samples of provider or insured
types, may yield conflicting results regarding the influence
of malpractice exposure on healthcare cost and health in-
surance markets. Further research may consider how spe-
cific provider specialties and patient groups are influenced
by changes in medical malpractice liability exposure.
Endnotes
1Reasons for the disagreement in the literature could
arise from a number of sources including differences in
sample characteristics, time periods, or econometric
methods. As such, the additional evidence on the influ-
ence of malpractice exposure on the frequency/cost of
services rendered by medical providers, presented in our
analysis, is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate
in the literature.
2For example, using data from the Physician Insurance
Association of America (PIAA), Kessler and McClellan
[24] find evidence that direct malpractice reforms reduce
defensive medicine practices but do not influence health
outcomes. Baicker, Fisher, and Chandra [25] find a posi-
tive relation between Medicare spending, especially on
imaging services, and malpractice awards which provides
support for the hypothesis that malpractice awards drive
defensive medicine rates.
3For example, Mello et al. [26] provide evidence that
suggests physicians reduce or eliminated “high risk” as-
pects of their practice. Kessler, Sage, and Becker [27]
provide evidence that tort reforms increase the supply of
physicians.
4This is not a universal sentiment in the literature. For
example, Morrisey, Kligore, and Nelson [4] do not find
any evidence that damage caps reduce the cost of em-
ployer sponsored health insurance. Given somewhat
conflicting results in prior literature, our analysis is valu-
able in that it provides insight into the ongoing debate
regarding how the medical professional liability climate
ultimately influences the health insurance market.
Table 8 Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms for Nine State Sample and Multiple Time
Periods
2002–2004 2002–2005 2002–2006 2002–2007 2002–2008 2002–2009 2002–2010
DDD Estimator 0.4919** 0.4347* 0.0733 0.2393 0.0666 0.2097 −0.1943
[0.235] [0.255] [0.260] [0.322] [0.343] [0.424] [0.379]
Treatment Dummy 0.2154*** 0.2154*** 0.2154*** 0.2154*** 0.2154*** 0.2154*** 0.2154***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Control Dummy 1.7160*** 1.7160*** 1.7160*** 1.7160*** 1.7160*** 1.7160*** 1.7160***
[0.199] [0.199] [0.199] [0.199] [0.199] [0.200] [0.200]
Control*Treatment −0.7563*** −0.7563*** −0.7563*** −0.7563*** −0.7563*** −0.7563*** −0.7563***
[0.292] [0.292] [0.292] [0.292] [0.292] [0.292] [0.292]
Reform Dummy −0.0404*** −0.0584*** −0.0429*** −0.0415*** −0.0299** −0.0555*** −0.0442***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] [0.008] [0.007]
Treatment*Reform −0.1005*** −0.0637** −0.0730** −0.0920*** 0.0243 −0.0416 −0.1374***
[0.025] [0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.041] [0.026] [0.025]
Control*Reform 0.1144 0.1988 0.5020*** 0.6142*** 0.6341*** 0.8821*** 0.9465***
[0.117] [0.131] [0.168] [0.189] [0.189] [0.232] [0.253]
Constant 0.3537*** 0.3537*** 0.3537*** 0.3537*** 0.3537*** 0.3537*** 0.3537***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 2682 2563 2520 2461 2433 2374 2335
R-squared 0.4285 0.4238 0.4177 0.4220 0.4073 0.4083 0.4079
Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences-in differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 2 and
only using the subsample of firms operating in 9 states as the non-treated group. The dependent variable, Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar
amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in
a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. In the table, “DDD estimator” is the difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator, “Treatment
dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, and “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the Texas reform measures. Each column of output
represents a separate analysis that compares LPEs in the year 2002 to a given, single year in the future. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses
and ***indicates p < 0.01, **indicates p < 0.05, and *indicates p < 0
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5In 2008 ten plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming
the state’s non-economic cap violates the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The suit, similar to those filed in other states with
such caps, argued that the cap has a direct impact on an
injured patient’s potential jury award and, consequently,
influences the value of filing the suit in the first place. A
federal judge ruled that the cap was constitutional in
2012.
6Interestingly, Hyman et al. [28] evaluate physician
supply in Texas before and after the 2003 reforms. They
find that physician supply in Texas was not deteriorating
before 2003 and “did not measurably improve after the
reform” (p.203).
7Other Texas-specific studies include Friedson and
Kniesner [29], who examine how the reform – specifically
the non-economic damages cap – has affected pre-trial
settlement speed and settlement amounts. They find that
even though injured plaintiffs are compensated more
quickly after reform, they receive a lower settlement. In
addition, Paik, Black, Hyman, Sage, and Silver [20] evalu-
ate the influence of the Texas reform on elderly patients.
They find that tort reform strongly affected claim rates
and payouts for all patients, but elderly claimants receive
disproportionately lower payouts after reform. Further, a
recent review of the Texas market indicates, among other
things, that “the reform bill’s most significant achieve-
ments have been increased access to health care and an
unanticipated positive economic impact on the Texas
economy. By the end of 2013, 10 years and three months
after the effective date of HB4, the number of licensed
physicians in the state will almost have doubled” [19].
8Paik et al. [22] posit a similar hypothesis regarding
physicians’ perception of malpractice risk.
9While much of our analysis relies on the NAIC’s
health insurance database, we also utilize the property-
casualty database for private passenger automobile loss
data. Both databases also contain information relating to
overall company financial information (for example, as-
sets, liabilities, organizational form). However, the analysis
presented here relies strictly on data from the state pages.
10The dataset includes financial data filed with state
insurance departments for all insurers classified as health
insurers and much of the data, including premiums,
claims, and enrollment, are reported separately for each
state in which an insurer operates
11Specifically, we restrict our sample to firms with at
least $100,000 in direct premiums written, $100,000 in
direct losses incurred, and 1000 enrollees. The inclusion
of these filters does not substantially reduce our sample
size and helps to reduce the effects of outliers in our
analysis. These filters ensure that the insurers included
in our analysis are non-trivial market participants in a
given state that are likely to be influenced by the oper-
ational and regulatory climate of a given state.
12This filter effectively ensures that we analyze firms
that were operating before and after the Texas reform
took effect.
13Previous studies similar in nature to ours (for ex-
ample, [22]) evaluate relative spending levels scaled by
enrollees. In addition, because the size of health insur-
ance markets, in terms of premium levels and insurers
vary widely across states, it would be inappropriate to
evaluate raw, unscaled loss levels across states. Further, a
loss measure scaled by premiums is more indicative of
financial/operational performance of the health insurer
while losses scaled by plan participants (enrollees) better
quantifies the amount of claims that insurance compan-
ies incur due to patients’ interactions with medical pro-
viders. We therefore believe that scaling by enrollees is
the most appropriate method for our analysis.
14The NAIC Health Insurance database, due to changes
in reporting requirements, does not provide consistent
and reliable data that can be used in our study before
2001. As such, we are forced to limit the start of our sam-
ple to 2001.
15Such DD analyses are frequently used in the econom-
ics, finance, and insurance literature (for example,
[22, 30, 31]). The method involves computing the dif-
ference between the pre- and post-, within-subjects
differences of the treatment and control groups. As it
applies to our analysis, the subjects are a sample of
health insurance companies, the treatment group is a
sub-sample of health insurers operating in Texas,
and the non-treated group is a sub-sample of health
insurers operating in other states.
16Health insurers operating in Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South
Carolina are not included in this subsample.
17These 18 states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and
Wyoming. Paik et al. [22] also include the District of
Columbia but, due to the unavailability of certain demo-
graphic data, we are forced to omit insurers operating
there in our analysis.
18These 9 states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming.
19We recognize that some of the states in these sub-
samples enacted other reforms relating to medical mal-
practice during our sample period but, following Paik
et al. [22], we believe these other reforms are not likely
to cause major changes in losses per enrollee and are
confident in the validity of these samples.
20Studies such as Bertrand, Duflo, and Mallainthan
[32] and Donald and Lang [33] suggest that, in certain
cases, econometric issues lead researchers to incorrectly
reject the null hypothesis of the statistical significance of
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a difference-in-differences coefficient. These studies pro-
vide evidence that clustering standard errors helps re-
duce the likelihood of a false rejection of the null. All
results reported throughout the paper are from models
with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In unre-
ported results, we also implement another procedure
found by Bertrand et al. [32] to reduce the likelihood of
an inaccurate rejection of the null, the block bootstrap
procedure. Our main results remain unchanged when
the block bootstrap procedure is implemented. Further,
our main results remain unchanged when we cluster
standard errors by state and also when we include state
and year effects (instead of the Treat and Reform dum-
mies in the main specification). Therefore, we do not be-
lieve that the common econometric pitfalls of DD
analysis described in the literature bias our results.
21For example, changes in the number of people with
health insurance.
22We select private passenger automobile physical
damage insurers because this line of business strictly re-
lates to property losses. As such, factors associated dir-
ectly with medical malpractice tort reform (for example,
liability lawsuits, physician behavior, and the like) do not
influence loss levels in this line of business. Similarly,
factors associated directly with health insurance (doctors,
healthcare costs, and so on) also do not influence loss
levels in this line of business. Thus loss levels in private
passenger automobile physical damage insurance are an
appropriate control.
23More specifically, we assign each insurer a number
of automobiles based on proportion of premiums insurer
i writes relative to all other insurers in a given state in a
given year. For example, assume total premiums written
in Texas for all insurers in 2010 was $1 billion and In-
surer A wrote $100 million in premiums in 2010. If
there are 1 million automobiles in the state of Texas in
2010, then Insurer A would be assigned (100 million/1
billion) X 1 million automobiles. Therefore, LPA for In-
surer A would be incurred automobile physical damage
losses divided by 100,000.
24Note the “DD Estimator” coefficients and statistical
significances reported are the regression coefficients of
Treat∗Reform from equation 1. However, in this output,
Reform takes the value of 0 if the year is 2002 and 1 if
the year is either 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, or
2010, depending on the specification.
25These results are available from the authors upon
request.
26For the same reasons described in a previous foot-
note, all reported results are from models with standard
errors clustered at the firm level. In addition, all re-
ported results are robust to different clustering strategies
described in a previous footnote as well as various com-
binations of state-level control variables.
27These are the same control variables included in the
DD analysis which are defined in a previous footnote. In
addition, unreported analysis indicates that our main re-
sult is robust to the inclusion of additional/alternative
demographic controls, such as uninsured rates and edu-
cational attainment.
28Note the “DDD” estimates and statistical significances
reported in the table are the regression coefficients of
Treat*Control*Reform from equation 2. However, in this
output, Reform takes the value of 0 if the year is 2002 and
1 if the year is either 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
or 2010, depending on the specification.
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